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Abstract
The lack of an effective means of preventing oil pollution of the oceans is largely the result of
international legal principles which ensure the free use of oceans. Compounding the problem is
the fact that flag of convenience registry effectively insulates from regulatory control most vessels
that pollute on the high seas, and results in the degredation of the marine environment. Flag of
convenience ships are responsible for most operational oil pollution in the high seas which, rather
than traumatic oil spills in coastal areas, poses the greatest threat to the environment. Conventions
on the high seas currently in force concentrate on pollution that occurs within the jurisdictional
limits of a coastal state. These conventions do not establish penalties for pollution on the high seas
when there is no direct impact on the interests of a particular state.
NOTES
PROTECTION OF THE HIGH SEAS FROM OPERATIONAL
OIL POLLUTION: A PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION
The lack of an effective means of preventing oil pollution of
the oceans' is largely the result of international legal principles
which ensure the free use of the oceans. 2 Compounding the prob-
1. The oceans of the world cover approximately 71% of the earth's surface, R. TAIT &
R. DE SANTO, ELEMENTS OF MARINE ECOLOGY 1 (1972), and play a vital role in the physical
and meteorological maintenance of the planet. Ward & Dubos, The Oceans, in THE ECOLOGY
OF MAN: AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH 292 (R. Smith 2d ed. 1976).
It is the oceans today that provide the water vapor which, drawn up by the sun,
falls upon the earth in harvest-bringing, life-sustaining rain. Ocean water is our
planet's filtering system where all debris, both mineral and biological, is dissolved,
decomposed, and transformed into life-supporting substances. It is the universal
global sink, a vast septic tank from which clean water returns to man, beast, and
plants by way of evaporation and precipitation. It is a major provider of the oxygen
released by its phytoplankton for the benefit of all the species of land, air, and sea-
breathing with lungs and gills. Without water's special qualities for holding heat,
much of the earth would be uninhabitable. The oceans are the coolants of the
tropics, the bringers of warm currents to cold regions, the universal moderators of
temperature throughout the globe.
Id.
The organisms that inhabit the oceans represent a major component in the global food
chain. Marine phytoplankton (microscopic floating plants) account for nearly thirty percent
of the net primary production which takes place on the planet. R. RICKLEFS, THE ECONOMY
OF NATURE 124 (1976). The total energy from the sun assimilated through photosynthesis is
called gross production. Id. at 112. Net primary production represents gross production less
the energy utilized by the photosynthetic plants for their own metabolism. A measure of net
primary production indicates the amount of energy available to higher levels of the food
chain. Id. at 112-13. Primary production is the driving force behind the global food chain, as
it is the sole means of assimilating energy from outside the ecosystem. Id. at 110. In addition
to its role as a generator of organic nutrition, primary production is important because it
generates oxygen as a by-product. W. KEErON, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 99-101 (2d ed. 1972).
The effects of oil on the marine environment are disturbing because of the destructive
nature and persistence of the pollutant. Schachter & Serwer, Marine Pollution Problems and
Remedies, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 88-89 (1971). The marine plankton, because they are
surface creatures, are particularly vulnerable to oil pollution. N. MOSTERT, SUPERSHIP 60
(1976).
For a thorough analysis of the myriad effects of oil on the marine environment, see
Anderson, National and International Efforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source Oil Pollu-
tion, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 985, 991-98 (1976); Dempsey & Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean
Vessels-An Environmental Tragedy: The Legal Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multila-
teral Conventions, and Coastal States, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 37, 43-48 (1980);
Schachter & Serwer, supra, at 88-91.
2. See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
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lem is the fact that flag of convenience registry3 effectively insulates
from regulatory control most vessels that pollute on the high seas,
and results in the degradation of the marine environment. 4 Flag of
convenience ships are responsible for most operational oil pollution5
in the high seas which, rather than traumatic oil spills6 in coastal
areas, poses the greatest threat to the environment. 7 Conventions on
the high seas currently in force concentrate on pollution that occurs
within the jurisdictional limits of a coastal state. 8 These conventions
do not establish penalties for pollution on the high seas when there
is no direct impact on the interests of a particular state.
The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea9 (Draft Conven-
tion) is a comprehensive attempt to set forth the rights and obliga-
tions of users of the oceans. 10 The Draft Convention contains nu-
merous provisions addressing marine pollution problems, and while
it in many ways improves upon previous conventions, it lacks suffi-
cient enforcement provisions."
The Draft Convention provides for action by coastal states in
situations where the activities of a ship or of another nation cause
pollution in the territorial waters of a coastal state.2 In addition,
3. Flag of convenience registry refers to those nations which permit the registration of
vessels by foreign shipowners under liberal registration laws. See infra notes 26-33 and
accompanying text.
4. According to a Vancouver Sun report which was based on a survey of tanker
incidents conducted by Lloyd's, Liberian and other flag of convenience vessels were responsi-
ble for two-thirds of the oil dumped into ocean and coastal waters as of September 30, 1976.
Vancouver Sun, Jan. 5, 1977, at 6, col. 1. See also Herman, Flags of Convenience-New
Dimensions to an Old Problem, 24 McGILL L.J. 1, 2 n.2 (1978).
5. Operational oil pollution includes the intentional discharges of oil that arise from the
normal operation of oil storage, transfer, and transportation systems, such as tank cleaning
and deballasting. Anderson, supra note 1, at 986 n.2.
6. Accidental spillage, due to damage to the oil containment system, is termed "trau-
matic" oil pollution. Id. at n.l.
7. Nearly one and one-half billion gallons of oil are spilled into the oceans annually.
Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 42. Of that spillage, 80-85% is caused by intentional
dumping. Id. at 42 n.15.
8. See infra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
9. U.N. Doe. A/CoNF.62/L.78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention]. The text
of the Draft Convention was approved at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea on April 30, 1982 by a vote of 130 in favor of the Draft Convention, 4 opposed (the
United States, Turkey, Venezuela and Israel), and 17 abstentions. U.N. Adopts Sea Law;
U.S. Votes No, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 9, col. 1.
10. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
12. Draft Convention, supra note 9, art. 220.
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the Draft Convention imposes a general obligation on flag states to
take steps to ensure that ships under their registry do not pollute.' 3
Where pollution by a ship occurs in the territorial waters of a
coastal state, or where pollution occurring outside the state's terri-
tory affects the state's interests, the Draft Convention allows the
coastal state to act directly against the ship. ' 4 The coastal state must
then notify the flag state of the incident and the action taken.' 5
However, where pollution occurs outside any state's territorial ju-
risdiction and does not directly affect the interests of any state, the
Draft Convention provides no enforcement mechanism requiring
appropriate action by the flag state.
Examination of the basic principles of international law relat-
ing to the registration of ships will point out the protection which
flags of convenience provide for polluters of the high seas. A discus-
sion of the international conventions already in force and of the
antipollution provisions of the Draft Convention will demonstrate
the inadequacy of these programs with respect to pollution which
occurs on the high seas. An enforcement regime will be proposed to
place liability for ocean pollution on the flag state, utilizing the
public trust concept to protect the marine environment.
I. FREE USE OF THE SEAS AND FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
Efforts to regulate pollution of the oceans by ships must be
framed in accordance with basic principles of international law,
which restrict the control that one nation may exercise over the
ships of another. Additionally, such efforts must adequately address
abuses of these principles engendered by flag of convenience regis-
try.' 6
International law has long recognized the free access to and use
of the high seas by all nations. As the legal regime of maritime
transportation has developed, ships have been ascribed a nation-
ality, an attribute which enables them to freely use and enjoy
the oceans without being subjected to the jurisdiction of another
nation anywhere on the high seas.17
13. Id. art. 217.
14. Id. art. 220(6).
15. Id. arts. 231, 217(6), 217(7).
16. See Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 40.
17. Id.
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These principles regarding the free use of the seas are set forth
in articles 2 and 5 of the International Convention on the High
Seas18 (High Seas Convention). Article 2 states that because "[t]he
high seas [are] open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. "19 Article 5 of the
Convention sets forth the exclusive competency of all states to grant
nationality to ships.2 0 The principle that vessels on the high seas are
subject only to the jurisdiction of the flag state is recognized in
international case law2 ' and is set forth in article 6 of the High Seas
Convention. 22 Exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag
state traditionally have been recognized in certain limited situations
including piracy,2 3 slave trade,2 4 and hot pursuit. 25
Several nations have taken advantage of the principles of free
access and use of the oceans by adopting ship registration laws
which permit foreign vessel owners to register their ships with these
nations. These so-called flag of convenience nations utilize permis-
sive registry laws as a means of inducing foreign ship owners to
18. Done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinaf-
ter cited as High Seas Convention].
19. Id. art. 2.
20. Id. art. 5. "Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships,
for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag." Id.
21. "[V]essels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State whose
flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the [high] seas ...no State may
exercise any kind of jurisdiction upon them." The Case of S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 25 (Judgment of Sept. 7). See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 239-42 (3d ed. 1979).
22. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 6. "Ships shall sail under the flag of one
State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in
these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." Id.
The ability of a coastal state to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign vessel is a function of
the location of the ship. In internal waters of the coastal state, the vessel is subject to complete
regulation. Control over the ship decreases as it proceeds towards the high seas. Anderson,
supra note 1, at 1001.
23. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, arts. 14-21. See Sweeney, Environmental
Protection by Coastal States: The Paradigm From Marine Transport of Petroleum, 4 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 278, 280-85 (1974). See also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 21, 243-45. This
exception is also recognized in the Draft Convention, supra note 9, arts. 100-107.
24. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 13. Under United States law, vessels
engaged in slave trade are subject to seizure, and the persons responsible for the ship are
subject to criminal prosecution. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1364 (1976). See also I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 21, at 249; Sweeney, supra note 23, at 282-85; Draft Convention, supra note 9, art. 99.
25. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 23. See also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 21,
at 250-53; Draft Convention, supra note 9, art. 111.
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register under their flags, a practice which produces substantial
revenues for the flag states.2 6
A flag of convenience has been defined as "the flag of any
country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-
controlled vessels under conditions which, for whatever the rea-
sons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are regis-
tering the vessels."'2 7 Because the imposition of ship registration
standards is a matter of domestic concern, 2 nations are free to
establish liberal registration laws aimed at attracting foreign ship
owners. 29 For a small nation with modest shipping needs, money
generated from registration fees and charges can have a substantial
impact on the nation's income and balance of payments. 30
An example of a flag of convenience state is Liberia, which
boasts the largest maritime fleet in the world. 3' Liberian law has
allowed the registration of vessels owned or controlled by foreign
citizens or foreign corporations. 32 In contrast, the United States
26. See infra note 30.
27. B. BoczEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 2 (1962). See
also OECD Study on Flags of Convenience, reprinted in 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 231, 232
[hereinafter cited as OECD Study]; Juda, IMCO and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution from
Ships, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 558, 577.
28. According to article 5 of the High Seas Convention, a state has exclusive competency
to grant to a ship the privilege to fly its flag. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 6. See
also Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 58.
29. See Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 53.
30. OECD Study, supra note 27, at 232. For an analysis of the financial impact on flag
states of revenues derived from vessel registration, see id. at 240-41. See also Dempsey &
Helling, supra note 1, at 54.
Typical examples of revenue-generating provisions of flag of convenience registry laws
are § 53 and § 54 of Title 22 of the Liberian Code of Laws. 22 LIBEMAN REVISED CODE OF
LAWS [LIB. REV. C.L.] §§ 53-54 (1977). Title 22 of the Liberian Code is the Maritime Code of
that flag of convenience nation. Section 53 provides for the payment of initial registry fees
and administrative charges based on the size of the vessel. Id. § 53. Section 54 imposes an
annual tax on each vessel registered under the Liberian flag, also based on the size of the ship.
This tax is payable in advance, on the first day of the year. Id. § 54.
31. Liberia has a merchant fleet of some 72 million registered tons. Panama, another
flag of convenience state, is currently in fourth place with 42 million tons, but is expected to
overtake Greece for third place by the end of 1982. Japan is currently in second place.
Panama Set to Become 3d Largest Ship Nation, J. COM., June 17, 1982, at 1B, Col. 3. Flag of
convenience owners have been in the forefront of the development of the supertankers, with
the first 100,000 and 300,000 deadweight ton vessels sailing under the Liberian flag. OECD
Study, supra note 27, at 248. For an analysis of the impact of the rapid growth and
development of the supertankers, see generally N. MOSTERT, supra note 1, at 84-108.
32. The Liberian Maritime Law states which vessels are eligible for registration under
the Liberian flag. 22 LIB. REV. C.L. § 51 (1977). Section 51 allows registration of:
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requires that a vessel be owned or controlled by a United States
citizen or a United States corporation or partnership in order to be
eligible for United States registry. 33
The advantages to shipowners of flag of convenience registry
are numerous, and such registration offers the operator of the vessel
a great competitive advantage over ships operated under the more
stringent rules of United States or British registry. For example,
under United States registry there are strict standards for physicial,
professional, educational and service qualifications of the crew,3 4
and the shipowner must provide wages and benefits according to
United States law. 35 In contrast, a flag of convenience vessel may be
operated with a less experienced and less well-paid crew. 3 The
United States requires its registered vessels to undergo repairs in
United States ports, or they must pay a tax on the repair work
performed abroad. 37 Flag of convenience states have no such re-
Any sea-going vessel of more than 1600 net tons engaged in the foreign trade,
wherever built, owned by a citizen or national of Liberia or owned by a citizen of
any foreign country. After January 1, 1975, no such sea-going vessels engaged in the
foreign trade, wherever built, shall be eligible for initial documentation or redocu-
mentation unless owned by a citizen or national of Liberia.
Id. § 51(b). Section 51(g) provides that "citizen or national" includes corporations, partner-
ships and associations of indivduals. Id. § 51(g). Under § 51, a foreign owner desiring to
register in Liberia must form a Liberian corporation in order to comply with the require-
ments. Formation of such a corporation is provided for in Title 5 of the Liberian Code, 5 LIB.
REv. C. L. § 13.1-.6 (1977), which allows the formation of "foreign maritime corporations"
or "maritime trusts" for the purpose of registering and operating vessels under the Liberian
flag. Id.
33. 46 U.S.C. § 65(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
34. 46 U.S.C. § 672(b) (Supp. IV 1980) sets forth requirements as to qualifications of
seamen for service on United States registered vessels. In addition, 46 U.S.C. § 221 (Supp. IV
1980) requires that masters and officers aboard United States registered vessels be United
States citizens.
35. 46 U.S.C. §9 591-608 (Supp. IV 1980) relate to wages for seamen on United States
registered vessels. Sections 651-692 set forth the rights and obligations of seamen and ship-
owners as to living and working conditions aboard United States ships. See Dempsey &
Helling, supra note 1, at 51.
36. Crew cost savings for flag of convenience ships have been estimated to account for
90-95 % of the economic advantage that such vessels enjoy over United States registered ships.
B. BoczEK, supra note 27, at 32.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1466 (Supp. IV 1980). The tax on foreign repairs to United States
registered ships is imposed in the form of a customs duty levied on the vessel when she calls at
a United States port. The provision allows for seizure of the vessel if the owner or master
willfully or knowingly fails to report the repairs and pay the appropriate duty. Id. § 1466(a).
The competitive disadvantage that this duty on foreign repairs causes for United States
shipowners was discussed by the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
when it investigated problems affecting the United States merchant fleet. See Final Report of
78 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:72
quirement for domestic repairs, 38 and, in fact, many flag of conven-
ience ships never visit ports in the state of registry. 39 Flag of conven-
ience registry also offers attractive tax advantages to ship owners,
because such flag states impose little or no taxes on the income from
ships. 40
United States maritime policy, which encourages a merchant
fleet "composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable
types of vessels," '41 is partly responsible for the use of flags of con-
venience by United States shipowners. In order to maintain a mod-
ern United States flag fleet, this country permits transfer of a
United States registered ship to foreign registry on condition that
the owner replace the vessel with a newly constructed ship under
the United States flag. 42 The result is that older ships are transferred
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Merchant Marine Study and Investi-
gation, S. REP. No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 73 (1950). Despite consideration of the
problem, § 1466 remains in effect.
See also B. BoczEK, supra note 27, at 32 (discussing the disadvantage which domestic
registry causes for United States shipowners, in contrast with flag of convenience registry).
38. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 50-51.
39. Id. at 63.
40. The Liberian Revenue and Finance Law specifically excludes from gross income "all
earnings derived from the operation, chartering or disposition of ships and aircraft." 37 LIs.
REv. C.L. § 11.23 (1977). For a discussion of the relationship between United States tax law
and flag of convenience registry, see Povell, New Developments in Taxation of Shipping
Under Flags of Convenience, 1977 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INsT. 211.
41. 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
42. 46 U.S.C. § 808 (1976) provides that
it shall be unlawful, without the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, to sell,
mortgage, lease, charter, deliver, or in any manner transfer, . . to any person not
a citizen of the United States, or transfer or place under foreign registry or flag, any
vessel or any interest therein owned in whole or in part by a citizen of the United
States and documented under the laws of the United States, or the last documenta-
tion of which was under the laws of the United States.
Id. This provision has been used by the Federal Maritime Administration as a means of
implementing the general policy stated in 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976), calling for a modern
United States flag merchant fleet. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
The Maritime Administration issued a Statement of Policy relating to transfer of vessels
from United States flag to foreign registry which provides for a "trade-out-and-build" pro-
gram. 21 Fed. Reg. 8588 (1956). Under this trade-out-and-build program, a vessel may be
transferred to the flags of Panama, Liberia, or Honduras if the United States shipowner will
replace the ship with a newly constructed vessel, and provided that the old vessel will remain
under United States ownership despite the foreign flag. Id. at 8588-89.
In 1981, § 808 was amended to substitute the Secretary of Transportation for the
Maritime Administration. Maritime Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-31, § 12(26), 95 Stat. 151,
155 (1981).
See also B. BOCZEK, supra note 27, at 33-36.
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to flags of convenience where they are manned by less skilled crews
than those aboard United States flag ships. The combination of
older vessels and less skilled crews increases the likelihood of acci-
dents involving flag of convenience ships.
43
The economic advantages of flag of convenience registration
are not inherently incompatible with an ecologically sound means
of oil transportation. However, the failure of flag states to enforce
effectively national and international safety and construction stand-
ards,44 coupled with the presence of less skilled crews aboard flag of
convenience ships, 45 has contributed to an increase in tanker acci-
dents. Indeed, losses and casualties for flag of convenience vessels
have been shown to exceed those for vessels registered in the country
of ownership. 46 The net result, whether due to crew deficiencies,
inferior ships, or lack of effective enforcement of standards, is that
when a ship flies a flag of convenience, the likelihood of mishap is
increased 47 while accountability for the spill is lessened. 48
Effective enforcement of antipollution standards by flag of
convenience nations is unlikely for several reasons. First, any effort
to regulate the activities of ships under their flags would discourage
registration, and would thus defeat the purpose of the flag of
convenience nations to attract shipowners. 49 Second, assuming the
43. See infra notes 44-48.
44. Juda, supra note 27, at 577. See also infra, notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., N. MOSTErr, supra note 1, at 76-83.
46. See supra note 4.
* 47. In a detailed study, Shell Oil found that
of forty serious tanker accidents that involved pollution, . . . the common link
between all was that "people made silly mistakes."
A very large number of the mistakes seem to be made by ships flying one of the
flags of convenience. These countries. . . have dominated the marine casualty lists
for some years.
N. MOSTERT, supra note 1, at 76.
48. Illustrative of the difficulty of exercising jurisdiction over a flag of convenience ship
after an accident are the experiences of the British and French governments after the
grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon. The ship was owned by the Barracuda Tanker
Corporation, a holding company of the Union Oil Company of California. The vessel was
leased to the Union Oil Company and subleased to British Petroleum Trading Limited, a
subsidiary of the British Petroleum Company. The Torrey Canyon was built in the United
States, rebuilt in Japan, and was registered in Liberia. The ship was insured in London and
crewed by Italians. N. MOSTERT, supra note 1, at 78.
The British and French took a pragmatic approach to the problem of obtaining jurisdic-
tion over any one responsible for the ship. Waiting until one of Torrey Canyon's sister ships
entered a port where the law was reasonably firm, they seized the ship and held her until the
insurers paid over U.S.$7,500,000 as a settlement for the damage caused by the oil spill. Id.
49. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 63 (citations omitted).
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states did wish to enforce these standards, they are not equipped to
do so. Flag of convenience ships rarely sail into ports of their flag
country, and the services of the flag of convenience nations are far
too small to police the merchant fleets under their flags.
50
International efforts have been mounted to eliminate flag of
convenience registry,5' but they face strong opposition from flag of
convenience nations and from the United States,5 2 and little has
been accomplished to date.5 3 Because of the "abuse . . of interna-
tional law by flag of convenience ships, '5 4 some means of effectively
holding polluters accountable must be developed. Because flag
states are responsible for the registration of vessels, and because
they have sole jurisdiction over these ships on the high seas, the
states themselves should bear responsibility for the conduct of ships
flying their flags, in the same way that states have been held liable
for environmental injuries emanating from within their borders. 55
II. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL
OIL POLLUTION
A. The IMCO Conventions
International environmental problems are usually handled,
like other types of international disputes, under the auspices of the
United Nations and its numerous specialized agencies.56 The Inter-
50. Id.
51. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has begun work on a
convention designed in part to eliminate flags of convenience. The draft convention requires
that 50% of the equity in vessels be held in the country of registry, and that the crew be
composed of at least 50% flag state nationals. Open-Registry Debate Commences in Geneva,
J. Com., Apr. 14, 1982, at 24B, col. 1.
52. U.S., Liberia to Boycott Ship Registry Talks, J. Com., Apr. 9, 1982, at 12A, col. 2.
For a discussion of the connection between United States maritime policy and flags of
convenience, see supra notes 41 and 42 and accompanying text.
53. The first round of talks aimed at elimination of flags of convenience ended in April
1982. After 17 days of discussion, the only accomplishment was a decision to meet again at an
unspecified time in 1983. Open-Registry Talks End; Little Achieved, J. Com., Apr. 30, 1982,
at 24B, col. 6.
54. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 40.
55. See infra notes 120-134 and accompanying text.
56. "The process of authoritative decision maintained by the ...[international] com-
munity for the resolution of environmental controversies and other matters is that of tradi-
tional international law, now built about the framework of the United Nations and the
specialized agencies and regional organizations." McDougal & Schneider, The Protection of
the Environment and World Public Order: Some Recent Developments, 45 Miss. L.J. 1085,
1088 (1974).
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national Maritime Organization57 (IMO) is the agency responsible
for marine pollution matters.5 8 It is among the smallest of the
United Nations agencies, and its predecessor, the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) was estab-
lished primarily as a "consultative and advisory" body.5 9 Neverthe-
less, IMCO has drafted most of the multilateral conventions on the
protection of the marine environment. B0
In its efforts to limit the pollution of the oceans, IMO must
operate within the constraints of international legal principles.61
International law imposes on users of the oceans (both private and
state entities) a duty not to pollute.62 This basic tenet Of interna-
tional law would appear to give the agency wide latitude in estab-
lishing conventions against the pollution of the seas. However, its
authority to regulate discharges of pollutants from vessels on the
high seas is restricted by principles favoring free use of the seas and
by jurisdictional limits based on the nationality of ships.6 3
57. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the successor organization to the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). See Newsbriefs, LLOYD'S
MAR. L. NEWSLETTER, May 27, 1982, at 4. Changes to the IMCO Constitution, including the
change of name, became effective May 22, 1982. Id. IMCO was established by the Conven-
tion on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 17, 1958, 9 U.S.T.
621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48.
58. Although ocean pollution regulation was not among the purposes specified in the
IMCO Constitution, the agency was given responsibility in this area from its inception. Juda,
supra note 27, at 560.
59. Id. at 559. See also Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 66 n.147.
60. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 66. The glacial progress inherent in multila-
teral negotiations of international environmental issues has often spurred nations to act on
these matters unilaterally. Anderson, supra note 1, at 1000-01, 1023. For discussions of the
role of unilateral actions in international environmental law, see generally Kindt, Special
Claims Impacting Upon Marine Pollution Issues at the Third UN Conference on the Law of
the Sea, 10 CAL. WES. INT'L L.J. 397 (1980); Note, The International Environmental Law of
the Sea: The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and its Effects, 1970-1980, 4
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 139 (1980). However, the effectiveness of such unilateral measures
is "frequently frustrated by the complex legal rules which govern the ability of a coastal
nation to regulate foreign vessels." Anderson, supra note 1, at 1001.
61. International law in this sense does not refer to any "formal" source of law, since
such a source does not exist in the same way as it would in a nation with a parliamentary
government. International law here refers to the "evidences of the existence of consensus"
among the nations of the world. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 21, at 2.
62. "Since the oceans are used by private and state entities, both are responsible when
they are remiss in fulfilling this duty [not to pollute]." Teclaff, International Law and the
Protection of the Oceans From Pollution, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 541 (1972).
63. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
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The first convention aimed at eliminating deliberate marine
oil pollution was the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 195464 (1954 Convention). The 1954
Convention adopted a zonal approach to marine pollution, in that
it prohibited the discharge of oil within fifty miles of land.6 5 The
1954 Convention applied to seagoing vessels registered in any of the
signatory nations.66 Vessels were required to maintain an oil record
book 7 which was subject to inspection by authorities of any con-
tracting nation. 8 Although amended in 1962,9 1969,70 and 1971,'71
the enforcement provisions of the 1954 Convention were inade-
quate to significantly lessen oil pollution. 72
64. Opened for signature May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as 1954 Convention]. By the time the 1954 Convention entered
into force, the IMCO Convention, supra note 57, had been ratified by a sufficient number of
states to become an agency of the United Nations, and it became the administering agency
pursuant to article XXI of the 1954 Convention. 1954 Convention supra note 64, art. XXI.
Nations which are party to the 1954 Convention account for some 95 % of the world's tanker
fleet. Mensah, International Environmental Law: International Conventions Concerning Oil
Pollution at Sea, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 110, 116 (1976).
65. 1954 Convention, supra note 64, art. III. While the 1954 Convention established a
50-mile prohibition zone, id. at Annex A, it did not extend coastal state jurisdiction to allow
enforcement beyond the territorial sea. Article XI states that: "Nothing in the present
Convention shall be construed as derogating from the powers of any Contracting Govern-
ment to take measures within its jurisdiction in respect of any matter to which the Conven-
tion relates or as extending the jurisdiction of any Contracting Government." Id. art. XI.
66. Id. art. II.
67. Id. art. IX(l).
68. Id. art. IX(2).
69. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil amends., adopted Apr. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T.
1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332. These amendments extend the application of the
1954 Convention to smaller vessels and establish larger areas within which the discharge of
oil is prohibited. See Teclaff, supra note 62, at 533 nn.18-19.
70. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil amends., adopted Oct. 21, 1969, 28 U.S.T.
1205, T.I.A.S. No. 8505, 9 I.L.M. 1 (1970).
71. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil amends., adopted Oct. 15, 1971, 11 I.L.M.
267 (1972). The 1971 amendments are not yet in force. These amendments primarily address
construction standards for tankers, and set requirements for placement of tanks in the vessel.
72. A survey conducted by IMCO in 1962 demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the 1954
Convention with respect to pollution outside territorial waters. Of the 15 offenses detected by
the time of the survey, none of them had been successfully prosecuted. Cycon, Calming
Troubled Waters: The Developing International Regime to Control Operational Pollution,
13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 35, at 39 n.15 (1980).
Although the amendments to the 1954 Convention imposed additional proscriptions on
the activities of vessels, they did nothing to provide for effective enforcement of the Conven-
tion. See supra notes 69-71.
In addition to remedies available under international conventions, a private owner of
shoreline property may have a remedy in admiralty for damage caused by oil pollution. See
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In 1969, IMCO promulgated the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage73 (Civil Liability Conven-
tion), which remains the primary convention relating to liability for
accidental or intentional damage caused by oil pollution. 74 The
Civil Liability Convention is "a reaffirmation and elaboration of
the general maritime law which imposes liability for damages for
oil pollution caused by a ship on the persons responsible for the
ship. '75 Although the Civil Liability Convention is a serious at-
tempt to provide a remedy for damages caused by oil pollution, it
applies only to damage caused in the territory of a signatory state.
76
When one considers the potential harm caused by the introduction
of oil into the marine environment, 77 it becomes clear that "protec-
tion of the world's beaches and protection of the marine ecology
itself are not synonomous."' 71 The Civil Liability Convention may
serve to provide compensation for damaged coastlines, but it does
nothing to prevent the discharge of oil on the high seas.
Also adopted in 1969 was the International Convention Relat-
ing to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties79 (Intervention Convention). The Intervention Conven-
tion granted contracting states the right to
Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 164-81 (1968). See also
Roady, Remedies in Admiralty for Oil Pollution, 5 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 361 (1977);
Teclaff, supra note 62, at 533-34 nn.18-23.
73. Done Nov. 29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Civil Liability Con-
vention].
74. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 69. In recognition of the financial limitations
of the Civil Liability Convention, IMCO adopted the Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, done Dec. 18, 1971, 11
I.L.M. 284 (1972). The Fund Convention provided for the establishment of a fund as a
supplement to the Civil Liability Convention. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 69.
Oil companies and tanker owners have established two voluntary liability plans, the
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP),
reprinted in THE Torio MARINE AND FIRE INSURANCE Co., LTD., COLLECTED MARITIME LAWS
371 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTED MARITIME LAWS], and the Contract Regarding an
Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), reprinted in COL-
LECrED MARITIME LAWS, supra at 380.
75. Teclaff, supra note 62, at 541 (footnotes omitted).
76. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 73, art. 2.
77. See supra note 1.
78. Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1, 41 (1972).
79. Done Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, 9 I.L.M. 25 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Intervention Convention].
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take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to
prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to
their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of
pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a maritime casualty
or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be
expected to result in major harmful consequences.8"
Although the Intervention Convention allows a coastal state to act
when its shoreline is threatened, it does not permit action by a
nation seeking to preserve the overall quality of the marine environ-
ment where there is no direct threat to that nation's interests. 81
The IMCO conventions and the voluntary agreements of the
tanker owners 82 represent positive steps in the area of liability for
marine pollution. The emphasis of the Civil Liability and the Fund
Conventions, however, is on remedies for damages after an oil spill.
It is ecologically and economically more effective to prevent the
spill than to develop complicated and expensive compensation
schemes which do little to restore the ecosystem once it has been
damaged. 83
In 1973, IMCO confronted this problem by adopting the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships84
(Pollution Convention), which goes far beyond the provisions of the
1954 Convention and the amendments thereto. The Pollution Con-
vention prohibits the discharge of any substance which is likely to
create a hazard to human health or to harm the living resources of
the oceans. 85 It applies not only to tankers, but to all vessels operat-
ing on the oceans. 8
80. Intervention Convention, supra note 79, art. 1. See generally Goldie, International
Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 301 (1970).
81. See supra notes 76-78.
82. See supra note 74.
83. Anderson, supra note 1, at 987.
84. Done Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Pollution Conven-
tion].
85. Id. arts. 1(1), 2(2).
86. Id. arts. 3, 2(4). The United States has incorporated into United States law the
provisions of the Pollution Convention, along with those of a Protocol to the Convention
adopted in 1978. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (Supp. IV 1980). In addition to these provisions,
Congress recognized that "navigation and vessel safety and protection of the marine environ-
ment are matters of major national importance," id. § 1221(a), and it enacted sections, which
provide for the establishment of vessel traffic control services to lessen the likelihood of
collision. Id. 1221-1223.
HIGH SEAS OIL POLLUTION
Despite the strength of the Pollution Convention with respect
to violations within territorial waters, 87 it remains ineffective as to
violations which occur on the high seas. The observing state may
notify the flag state of such incidents, but it is then the responsibil-
ity of the flag state to take action.88 Where the polluting ship flies a
flag of convenience, it is not likely that the flag state will act. 8
B. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea
The most recent efforts to control marine pollution are em-
bodied in the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea.90 This draft
is the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III). UNCLOS III was convened in 1973, the
result of a United Nations General Assembly Resolution calling for
a:
conference on the law of the sea which would deal with the
establishment of an equitable international regime-including
an international machinery-for the area and the resources of
the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction, a precise definition of the
area, and a broad range of related issues including those con-
cerning the regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the
territorial sea ... and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation
of the living resources of the high seas (including the question of
the preferential rights of coastal States), the preservation of the
marine environment (including, inter alia, the prevention of
pollution) and scientific research."1
87. Article 4 of the Pollution Convention allows a State to act under its own laws against
ships for violations which occur while the ship is within the State's jurisdiction. The State
may also notify the flag state of the violation and allow the flag state to take appropriate
steps. Pollution Convention, supra note 84, art 4; cf. Draft Convention, supra note 9, art.
218 (provisions for port state jurisdiction). See also infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
90. Supra note 9.
91. G.A. Res. 2750, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 242, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2750
(1970). The General Assembly assigned the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed
and the Ocean Floor (Sea-bed Committee) the task of conducting preparatory work for the
conference. Id. In 1972, the Sea-bed Committee reported that it had developed a list of issues
relating to the law of the sea that would serve as a framework for discussion and drafting of
1982]
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The Draft Convention represents an unusual step in interna-
tional environmental regulation in that the antipollution provisions
contained therein were negotiated in conjunction with a broad
range of nonpollution issues. Historically, the response of the inter-
national community to environmental problems has been piece-
meal92 and ex post facto. 3 Developing an antipollution regime as
an international regime pursuant to Resolution 2750. Report of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean floor beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction,
27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 5, U.N. Doc A/8721 (1972).
The first sessions of UNCLOS III were largely procedural. At a session held in New York
in 1973, the conference decided to establish three main committees, each responsible for
negotiation of particular issues, and a Drafting Committee, responsible for drafting the
convention eventually negotiated. Statement of Activities of the Conference During its First
and Second Sessions, 3 Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea OR [UNCLOS III OR]
at 93, 95, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.8/REV.1 (1974). At the second session, the issues
identified in the Sea-bed Committee's list were apportioned among the three main commit-
tees, with Committee III given responsibility for issues relating to the preservation of the
marine environment. 3 UNCLOS III OR at 97-98.
Although the three negotiating committees held formal meetings, the bulk of the work
was conducted in informal sessions at which no records were kept. 2 G. TIMAGENIS, INTERNA-
TIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE POLLUTION 583 (1980). Reports on the work of the various
committees appear as summaries presented by the chairmen of the committees, which are
published throughout the official records of UNCLOS III.
By the end of the third session of UNCLOS III in 1975, the Chairmen of the three
committees had drafted an Informal Single Negotiating Text (SNT), 4 UNCLOS III OR at
137, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975). The SNT reflected the work which had been
accomplished at the formal and informal discussions of the Committees. 4 UNCLOS III OR
at 19, 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.2/Add.l para.92 (1975). The SNT would serve as the
basis for negotiations in subsequent sessions of the conference. Id. See also Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of the Sea: A Synopsis, 13 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 628, 629 (1976).
Discussion at the fourth session of UNCLOS III was based on the SNT, and the results of
those talks were incorporated into the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT). 5 UNCLOS
III OR at 125, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/REV.1 (1976), which was presented at the end
of the session.
Subsequent sessions of the conference produced an Informal Composite Negotiating Text
(ICNT), 8 UNCLOS III OR at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
ICNT], and two revisions of the ICNT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1, reprinted in
18 I.L.M. 686 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/R], and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/
Rev.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/R2].
92. The piecemeal response of authorities to international environmental problems
reflects the lack of a unified conceptual framework for addressing such problems. The result
is that environmental efforts are often directed at a single problem, such as oil, radioactive
wastes or other toxic substances, and they focus on particular sources of pollutants, such as
vessels or drilling rigs, rather than taking a comprehensive approach to environmental
regulation. Bleicher, supra note 78, at 2-5.
This method of solving ecological problems is perhaps understandable, though not
excusable, in light of the nature of environmental regulation. Such regulation is geared
toward prevention or modification of activities which may cause damage to individuals as
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part of an overall plan for the oceans may result in a more effective
mechanism for protecting the oceans.
The Draft Convention addresses a wide range of ocean related
issues, including jurisdiction over territorial waters,9 4 areas of the
oceans adjoining territorial waters,95 and matters relating to the use
of the high seas. 96 A substantial portion of the Draft Convention
addresses the orderly exploitation and development of the oceans,
97
but UNCLOS III was also given the task of establishing a regime
related to the preservation of the oceans."" As a result, the Draft
Convention contains numerous marine pollution provisions.99
The marine pollution provisions in the Revised Informal Nego-
tiating Text 00 are essentially the same as those appearing in the
Draft Convention.10' A number of provisions of the Draft Conven-
well as to the ecosystem. Unlike consumer protection or workman's compensation, the
victims of environmental damages are generally not contractually related to the tortfeasors
whose activities cause the injury, and therefore the interests of these non-related parties are
overlooked. Id. at 6.
93. Environmental remedies have historically been applied ex post facto, which is
clearly an unwise approach due to the inherent inaccuracies in estimating the degree of
pollution which a given ecosystem can withstand. Kindt, Prolegomenon to Marine Pollution
and the Law of the Sea: An Overview of the Pollution Problem, 11 ENV. L. 67, 68 (1980).
An excellent example of ex post facto environmental action is the response of the
international community to the wreck of the Torrey Canyon, a supertanker which broke up
off the coast of Brittany. The disaster caused the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization to promulgate the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage and the Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensa-
tion for Oil Pollution Damage. Cusine, Liability for Oil Pollution Under the Merchant
Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act, 10 J. MAR. L. & Com. 105, 107 (1978). See also Report on
International Control of Oil Pollution, H.R. REP. No. 628, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967).
94. See Draft Convention, supra note 9, arts. 2-32.
95. Id. arts. 33, 55-75.
96. Id. arts. 86-120.
97. Part XI of the Draft Convention relates to the rights of various parties with respect
to the "Area." Id. arts. 133-191. The Area is defined in article 1 as "the sea-bed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Id. art. 1(1). Articles 150-
155 concern the development of the resources (living resources as well as mineral resources) of
the Area. Sections 4 and 5 of Part XI set forth provisions for the establishment of an Authority
to administer the Convention, as well as provisions for the settlement of disputes arising out
of the use of the Area.
98. See supra note 91.
99. See Draft Convention, supra note 9, arts. 192-237.
100. See supra note 91.
101. Compare ICNT/R, supra note 91, arts. 192-237 with Draft Convention, supra note
9, arts. 192-237. The issues related to sea-bed mining and transfer of technology have proven
particularly difficult to negotiate. See, e.g., Synopsis: Recent Developments in the Law of the
Sea 1978-1979, 17 SAN Diwo L. REv. 691, 694-98 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Synopsis: 1978-
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tion address marine pollution indirectly in the context of coastal
state jurisdiction 102 and flag state duties, 10 3 but the bulk of the
pollution provisions are contained in Part XII of the Draft Conven-
tion. 104
The provisions of Part XII require states to ensure that activi-
ties under their jurisdiction do not cause damage by pollution to
other states. 105 Article 211 of the Draft Convention requires that the
states, through appropriate international organizations, establish
international standards for the prevention of pollution from ves-
sels.10 It also requires that individual states adopt laws and regula-
tions to control pollution from ships flying their flags. 107 Under this
provision, the rules adopted by the flag state must be at least as
effective as the international standards. 0 8 Unfortunately, the Draft
Convention itself does not provide any such standards, but leaves
the establishment of pollution standards for future negotiation.10 9
Articles 213 through 236, relating to enforcement of antipollu-
tion measures, contain the most serious weaknesses of the Draft
Convention. Article 217 requires flag states to ensure that their
registered ships comply with domestic and international stand-
ards. 110 Flag states are to prohibit ships under their registry from
sailing unless they comply with these standards."' The ability of a
flag of convenience nation to effectively monitor the condition of its
1979]; Synopsis: Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1979-1980, 18 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 533, 535-44 (1981).
The marine pollution issues were negotiated much more quickly. The Chairman of
Committee III, in his report after the eighth session, indicates that the substantive negotia-
tions on protection and preservation of the marine environment could be considered closed.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.34 para.12 (1979). See also Synopsis 1978-1979, supra, at 700.
102. See Draft Convention, supra note 9, arts. 19(2)(h), 21(l)(d) & (f), 56(1)(b)(iii).
103. See id. art. 94(7).
104. Id. arts. 192-237.
105. Id. art. 194(2).
106. Id. art. 211(1).
107. Id. art. 211(2).
108. Id.
109. The absence of such standards is perhaps understandable when one considers that
the aim of the pollution provisions is not direct regulation, but the identification of who is
going to establish the substantive rules on regulation of pollution. With that aim in mind, it is
not surprising that the Draft Convention avoids addressing technical matters, and concen-
trates on statements of the rights and obligations of the various parties. G. TIMAGENIs, supra
note 91, at 603.
110. Draft Convention, supra note 9, art. 217(1).
111. Id. art. 217(2).
HIGH SEAS OIL POLLUTION
registered ships is doubtful, especially in view of the small size of
their navies and the infrequency with which the ships visit ports in
the flag state.112
Articles 218 and 220 address the enforcement of pollution
provisions by port states and coastal states, respectively. Article 220
provides for enforcement by a coastal state for violations which
occur within its jurisdiction." 3 A coastal state is the obvious party
to act against pollution which occurs in its own jurisdiction.
The Draft Convention permits a port state, while a ship is
voluntarily in its port, to undertake investigations with respect to
violations which occurred outside its jurisdiction." 4 Paragraph 2 of
article 218 indicates, however, that a port state cannot act with
respect to violations which occur in another state's jurisdiction.115
Taken together, the paragraphs indicate that a port state may
initiate actions against a ship which has polluted on the high seas
since it is not within the jurisdiction of another state. Such author-
ity would be a useful mechanism for enforcement, but it places the
burden of action on the port state, although the benefits of such
action would accrue to the international community collectively.
Article 235 indicates that contracting states "are responsible
for the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall
be liable in accordance with international law.""16 Although this is
a great step forward in establishing state liability for pollution of
the oceans from ships, it does not provide any real penalties for
states which fail to meet these obligations, nor does it serve to
discourage flag of convenience registry.
The provisions of the Draft Convention are significant in that
they are not framed as isolated responses to environmental prob-
lems, but as integral elements of an international effort to set forth
the law of the sea. However, an effective regime to prevent pollu-
tion of the oceans requires, in addition to the imposition of obliga-
tions on parties that use the oceans, the establishment of an author-
ity to enforce these obligations with respect to violations which
occur outside the jurisdiction of any particular state.
112. See supra text accompanying note 50.
113. Draft Convention, supra note 9, art. 220.
114. Id. art. 218(1).
115. Id. art. 218(2).
116. Id. art. 235(1).
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Because of the principle of international law that ships on the
high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state," 7
and because of the problems associated with the flags of conven-
ience," 8 it is apparent that a body of international law must be
developed to make the flag states themselves liable for environmen-
tal damage caused by their ships. International case law "clearly
point[s] to the emergence of strict liability [for environmental in-
jury] as a principle of public international law."""
In the Corju Channel Case,120  British warships passing
through Albanian territorial waters unknowingly entered a mine-
field, resulting in a number of deaths and personal injuries to
British sailors and damage to several British vessels. Despite the fact
that Albania had not laid the minefield and claimed ignorance of its
existence, the International Court of Justice inferred Albanian
knowledge of the danger and found for the British. The Court
found that "every [State has an] obligation not to allow knowingly
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States."12 Although the military context of the Corfu Channel Case
117. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 6(1). See also Draft Convention, supra
note 9, art. 92.
118. See supra notes 16-55 and accompanying text.
119. Coldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 306 (1970).
The notion of state liability for the activities of private entities under its jurisdiction is
not completely new. This principle appears, for example, in the Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, done January 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205. Article VI of the Treaty provides that: "States Parties to the Treaty shall bear
international responsibility for national activities in outer space. . . .whether such activities
are carried on by government agencies or by non-governmental entities." Id. art. VI.
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, done
March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 11 I.L.M. 250 (1972), provides, in
article II, that: "A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight." Id. art. II.
Article I(c) of the Space Objects Liability Convention defines "launching State" as "(i) a State
which launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) a State from whose territory
or facility a space object is launched." Id. art. I(c).
For a discussion of state liability under the Space Objects Liability Convention, see
Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
346 (1980).
120. (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
121. Id. at 22. See Bleicher, supra note 78, at 16.
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removes it from the realm of "typical" transnational environmental
law cases,122 the decision is nevertheless useful as a basis for estab-
lishing direct state responsibility for environmental injury by anal-
ogy. 123
The Trail Smelter Arbitration12 4 directly addresses state liabil-
ity for extraterritorial environmental injury caused by a private
concern within its territory. The case involved damages caused by
sulphur dioxide fumes emanating from a copper smelting plant at
Trail, British Columbia. The smelter was operated by a company
incorporated under a Canadian charter. 25 The governments of the
United States and Canada began discussion of the matter in 1927,126
and in 1935 they entered into a convention for the establishment of
a tribunal to resolve the dispute.127
The tribunal, in deciding for the United States, held that
"under the principles of international law . . . no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such manner as to
cause injury . . . in or to the territory of another .... ,, s Further-
more, the tribunal held that "the Dominion of Canada is responsi-
ble in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter."' 2 9
122. Bleicher, supra note 78, at 17.
123. Id.
124. (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684
(1941).
125. Id. at 1917, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 692-93.
126. The initial complaints in the case came in 1925, when a number of property
owners in Washington complained to the Trail Smelter Company. Id. at 1917, 35 AM. J.
INT'L L. at 693. These complaints led to private settlements between the company and the
property owners. Id.
The United States government took up the matter with the Canadian government in
1927, and it was referred to the International Joint Commission between the United States
and Canada. This Commission was established pursuant to article IX of the Convention of
January 11, 1909, between the United States and Great Britain. Under that convention,
questions arising between the two nations were to be referred to the International Joint
Commission which would examine the matter and report its findings. Reports of the Com-
misssion were not, however, binding. Id. at 1918, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 693.
The Commission considered questions relating to the Trail Smelter between October,
1928 and February, 1930. It issued its final report in February, 1931. Id.
127. Convention between the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada
relative to the establishment of a tribunal to decide questions of indemnity and future regime
arising from the operation of smelter at Trail, British Columbia, Apr. 15, 1935, United
States-Canada, 49 Stat. 3245, T.S. No. 893.
128. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 716.
129. Id. at 1965-66, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at.716-17.
92 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:72
In Lake Lanoux Arbitration,130 a dispute arose between Spain
and France over the latter's proposal to build a hydroelectric power
project. Spain objected on the grounds that the project would divert
water from Lake Lanoux. France won the arbitration, after show-
ing that it would take steps to replace the water lost with an equal
quantity of water from a nearby river. The replacement water
would be of comparable quality to that which was lost. While the
Lake Lanoux Arbitration is not, strictly speaking, an "environmen-
tal law" case, in that it is based on the conflict between the prop-
erty rights of riparian owners, the case is relevant because it estab-
lishes that a nation is not entitled to unrestricted use of waters, but
must consider the consequences to others with interests in the wa-
ter. 131
The three cases together establish
a consistent . . .set of principles governing state responsibility
for transnational environmental damage. The overriding propo-
sition is that a state may not use or permit the use of its territory
in such a manner as to cause substantial damage in another
state .... The restriction extends beyond state-initiated activity
to private activity, which will be imputed to the defendant state
if it knew of its injurious character.132
The case law therefore indicates that a state is liable for dam-
ages caused by the activities of its own instrumentalities or those of
a private enterprise under its jurisdiction. Although the cases dis-
cussed dealt with injuries which arose within the territories of the
states in question, these principles may be extended to apply to
incidents which arise outside the territory of the defendant state,
but where the wrongdoer is nonetheless subject to the defendant
state's jurisdiction.
It is true that states are free to grant nationality to ships, 33 but
it is equally true that "international law gives to states . .. the
mandate to employ their sovereignty in such a way that they do not
violate international law.' 34 Just as the copper plant in the Trail
130. (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1963), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L.
156 (1959).
131. Bleicher, supra note 78, at 25-26.
132. Id. at 28.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
134. H. MEYmS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 108 (1967).
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Smelter Arbitration was operating under Canadian charter, a vessel
on the high seas operates under the privileges of nationality granted
by the flag state. If a nation is liable for the conduct of a corpora-
tion operating within its borders, a flag state should bear liability
for actions of its vessels on the high seas where the flag state has
exclusive jurisdiction over the ship.
IV. THE PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT REGIME
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
Adoption of an approach whereby flag states would be liable
for damages to the oceans by their ships 35 would not, in itself, solve
the problem of pollution on the high seas. Because pollution on the
high seas may not directly affect the interests of an individual state,
and because international law prohibits the exercise of sovereignty
over the high seas, 36 an international body with authority to act
against flag states for pollution by their ships must be recognized.
The public trust doctrine provides a suitable legal basis for the
creation of such an authority to protect the oceans. The public trust
doctrine recognizes that "certain defined property is held . . . in
trust [by the state] for the public,' 137 and that the trustee "has a
high fiduciary duty of care and responsibility to the general pub-
lic." ' 38 The modern public trust doctrine has its roots in the Roman
concept of res communes, the principle that some forms of property
are incapable of exclusive ownership. 39 Under Roman law the
doctrine of res communes applied to "the common property of all:
air, running water, the sea, and with it the shores of the sea.' 40
135. See supra notes 116-133.
136. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 2.
137. Nanda & Ris, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to International
Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291, 296 (1976).
138. Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970
UTAH L. REV. 388.
139. Coquillette, Mosses From an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property
Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 800 (1979).
140. F. DE ZULUErA, THE INSTITUTES OF GAius 2.1.1 (1953) (quoted in Coquillette,
supra note 139, at 801). Along with res communes, Roman law recognized res religiosae,
items which because of their sacred nature were protected from use in commerce. BLACK'S
LAW DICTION~aY 1174 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). It also recognized res nullius, items which were
not susceptible of private ownership. Id.
The res communes doctrine entered English law early, and by the sixteenth century the
doctrine was developed to the point where a private remedy for disturbance of the res
communes (the forest) had been created. Coquillette, supra note 139, at 804-06. In the
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The doctrine exists in various forms in many countries, al-
though it is not as developed as it is in the United States.'14 How-
ever, "[tihe principles of public trust are such that they can be
understood and embraced by most countries of the world."'' 42 For
example, under the French Civil Code resources such as highways,
streets, navigable rivers, streams, canals, the sea coast, ports and
bays are within the public domain, 43 and the government is
charged with the supervision and maintenance of the resources. 44
Several contemporary European systems of wildlife management
share the notion that free-living wild animals are ownerless,145 a
notion derived from the Roman concept of res nullius. 146 Although
the party charged with management of the wildlife varies
widely, 147 some authority is identified which is responsible for pro-
tecting the resources. 48 More akin to the United States concept of
the public trust is the Mexican law of common use property.1 49
United States, the doctrine of res communes was recognized by the Supreme Court in Illinois
Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). This case involved a grant to the railroad of
submerged lands in the Chicago harbor. In voiding the grant, the Court held that the state
possessed the land "in trust for the people of the State." 146 U.S. at 452.
The public trust doctrine has been applied in a number of recent cases. In North Dakota
ex. rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.D. 1981), the district
court denied a claim of adverse possession by the United States with respect to certain lands
under the Little Missouri River. The court held that because North Dakota held the lands in
trust for the people of the state, it "[could] never abdicate its trust obligation." 506 F. Supp.
at 625.
New Jersey courts have recently applied the doctrine in determining the rights of parties
to recreational uses of beaches. See, e.g., Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp.
1254 (D.N.J. 1982); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978); Borough
of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
141. Nanda & Ris, supra note 137, at 306.
142. Id.
143. 2 C. AUBR' & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANPAis 51-52 (P. Esmein 7th ed. 1961)
(citing CODE CIVIL art. 538 (81st ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82)).
144. Id. at 50.
145. Wolfe, European Wildlife Administration, in WILDLIFE LAW ENFORCEMENT 28, 31
(W. Sigler 3d ed. 1980).
146. Id. at 29.
147. In the German speaking countries of Europe, the unit of wildlife management is
the hunting district, or revier. Wolfe, supra note 144, at 33. The owner of the hunting rights
for the revier (either the landowner or a tenant) is the custodian of the wildlife in the district
and is under moral and social obligations to preserve the wildlife for the remainder of society.
Id. at 34-35.
In the communist countries of Eastern Europe hunting rights are controlled by the state,
which establishes hunting districts and manages the wildlife. Id. at 34.
148. See supra note 146.
149. Under the Mexican Civil Code, public property is categorized as bienes de uso
comn, property for common use, bienes destinados a un servicio pisblico, property destined
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Under the Mexican Civil Code, common use property is identified
as bienes de uso comin,150 which includes the seashore, harbors,
bays, rivers, streams and highways.1 51 Bienes consist of three cate-
gories, depending upon whether they can be owned privately, held
in trust by a municipality, or not subjected to ownership. 52
The public trust doctrine is "readily adaptable to the whole
range of issues that comprise our environmental dilemma."'' 53 The
flexibility of the doctrine in adjudicating environmental issues is
seen in several cases in which it has been applied. In Smoke Rise,
Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,M real estate
developers challenged a ban on additional sewer hookups which
two counties had instituted. The developers claimed that the ban
constituted a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
and that they were deprived of property rights without due process.
In denying the plaintiffs' claims, the district court noted that the
ban was designed to prevent pollution of the rivers and streams in
the area due to overloaded sewage treatment systems. The court
wrote: "In their natural state, the streams and rivers of Prince
George's and Montgomery Counties are unpolluted. Through the
public trust doctrine, the State of Maryland has the duty of preserv-
ing the natural, unpolluted condition of these waterways." 1
55
In Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Steam Ship Zoe Coloco-
troni,156 the Court held that the Commonwealth had standing to
sue the owners of a ship which spilled oil into a bay in southwestern
Puerto Rico. The court found that the Commonwealth had stand-
ing based upon its proprietary interest in the bay and "because it is
the trustee of the public trust" in the resources which were dam-
aged by the spill. 5 7 Likewise in In re Steuart Transportation Co., 
5 8
for public service use, and bienes propios, property for special use. Cooico CIVIL art. 767
(46th ed. Editorial Porrua 1979) (Mex.). See also Note, California Beach Access: The Mexican
Law and the Public Trust, 2 Ecology L.Q. 571, 601 (1972). The bienes propios is similar to
our concept of public domain, and this property could be used by the government as a source
of revenue. Id. at 601-02.
150. See supra note 149.
151. Note, supra note 149, at 602.
152. Id. at 603.
153. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 172 (1971).
154. 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975).
155. Id. at 1382.
156. 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978), afJ'd, 602 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1979), modified, 628
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
157. Id. at 1337.
158. 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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the district court held that although certain migratory waterfowl
which were killed by an oil spill were not owned by the State of
Virginia or by the Federal Government, both could maintain
actions against the defendant for the damages to these animals
under the public trust doctrine and under the doctrine of parens
patriae.15s The court noted that "[u]nder the public trust doctrine,
the State of Virginia and the United States have the right and duty
to protect and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife
resources. Such right does not derive from ownership of the re-
sources but- from a duty owing to the people." 60
The public trust doctrine would provide a suitable means of
protection of the. high seas from oil pollution. Because the high seas
are, not subject to ownership by individual claims, a public trust
approach would give a recognized trustee the right to act on behalf
of the general public.
B. Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to
the Marine Environment
It has been suggested that the public trust doctrine provides
the necessary legal underpinnings for international environmental
law. '' Such an approach calls for an international trustee to act
against polluters, in areas where individual states lack jurisdiction,
or where they are, not directly affected by the injury to the environ-
ment.. In the area. of protection of the marine environment a logical
choice for an international public trustee would be the Authority
provided for in Part XI of the Draft Convention on the Law of the
Sea,. 62
159. Id: at 40 .
160. d .
16k. See generally, Nanda and Ris, supra note 137. Nanda and Ris also suggest that the
United Nations would be the appropriate body to enforce the trust. Id. at 314-15.
Certain elements of the public trust doctrine-are already present in international law.
For example; the principlethat no state may exercise sovereignty over the high seas, see High
Seas Convention,,supra note 18,, art. 2; Draft Convention, supra note 9, art. 89, is similar to
the: doctrines of. res communes and: res nullius. See supra note 140. Article 136 of the Draft
Convention, indicates, that. the. high seas and the sea-bed are the common heritage of man-
kind: Draft Convention,. supra note 9,. art. 136.
162. See Draft Convention, supra note 9, arts. 156-185. The Authority would consist of
anAssembly, a Council, and'a Secretariat.. Id. arts. 159-169. The Draft Convention gives the
Authority legal status to implement the provisions of the agreement, and to ensure that the
objectives of the convention are met. Id. arts. 157, 176.
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The Draft Convention recognizes the invalidity of claims of
sovereignty over the high seas163 and the Area. 6 4 The invalidity of
such claims precludes action by an individual state where there is
no direct impact on the state's interests. However, the Draft Con-
vention also recognizes that "[t]he Area and its resources are the
common heritage of mankind,"' 65 and that "[a]ll rights in the re-
sources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose
behalf the Authority shall act. '16 6 The Draft Convention addition-
ally states that the Authority shall adopt rules, regulations and
procedures for "the protection and conservation of the natural re-
sources of the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and
fauna of the marine environment."'1
6 7
Because the high seas and the Area are not subject to exclusive
ownership and because they are recognized as the common heritage
of mankind, application of the public trust doctrine is an appropri-
ate measure to ensure the protection of the marine environment.1
6 8
The obligations of the Authority under the Draft Convention im-
pose upon it duties to take steps to preserve the oceans for the
benefit of mankind; the Authority is, therefore, the appropriate
body to act as the trustee.6 9
The Authority would also function as the administrator of all
the activities under the Draft Convention, which would allow it to
implement environmental protection measures in conjunction with
plans to develop the resources of the oceans. In this way, the
Authority could avoid the problems of ex post facto environmental
measures. 70 The Authority would be in a position to promulgate
development schemes which are environmentally and economically
sound at the outset, rather than apply subsequent compensation
schemes for ecological damages caused as a result of the activity.
163. Id. art. 89.
164. Id. art. 137(1). The "Area" is defined as "the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the
subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Id. art. 1(1).
165. Id. art. 136.
166. Id. art. 137(2).
167. Id. art. 145(b).
168. See supra note 161.
169. The obligation imposes a fiduciary duty owing to the people of the world. Such a
fiduciary duty is one of the obligations of the public trustee under the public trust doctrine.
See Cohen, supra note 138, at 388.
170. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
"Because our oceans cannot be fenced and hence made private
property,"' 71 they remain susceptible to the "tragedy of the com-
mons. ' 172 In order to avoid the complete degradation of the oceans,
and with it the earth itself, 173 there must be an enforceable regime
to protect the seas from operational oil pollution. "While the ...
traditional notions of the law of the seas ... placed the right and
obligation of regulating ships upon the flag state, contemporary
experience has proven that this regime is wholly inadequate" for
tanker regulation. 174
The antipollution provisions of the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea 175 could prove useful in eliminating marine pollu-
tion if, in addition to these provisions, an effective enforcement
mechanism is adopted. United Nations recognition of the public
trust doctrine in the area of preservation of the marine environment
"would provide an authoritative basis for encouraging and promot-
ing a wider acceptance of the notion that states are responsible not
only to their own nationals, but also to all humankind for the
maintenance, preservation, and conservation of selected uses and
resources."' 176 Adoption of the public trust doctrine and appoint-
ment of the Authority as the international public trustee would
permit effective enforcement of antipollution measures for the ben-
efit of the international community.
Application of the principles established in the Corfu Channel
Case and the Trail Smelter and Lake Lanoux arbitrations177 would
create in the public trustee a right of action against flag states
whose ships pollute the high seas. Such liability on the part of the
flag state would perhaps serve as sufficient incentive to ensure that
their registered ships comply with international standards regard-
171. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 39.
172. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). The underlying
notion of the tragedy of the commons is that
rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the
commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since
this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so
long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.
Id. at 1245.
173. See supra note 1.
174. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 65. See also supra notes 17-50.
175. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
176. Nanda & Ris, supra note 137, at 314.
177. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
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ing the pollution of the oceans, and would thereby defeat the abuses
of flag of convenience registry. This approach to flag state liability
would not interfere with the sovereign rights of the flag state, nor
would it impinge upon the rights of free access to and use of the
oceans. The result of such a regime would be that if a state wished
to maintain a flag of convenience and to register ships which do not
meet international standards, it would do so at its own economic
risk.
The potential threat to the oceans, and therefore to the entire
ecosystem, is such that some action must be taken. "That the very
seas should be considered a wasting asset must surely be the essen-
tial nightmare of the whole business of the despoliation of this
planet .... . .178
Barney T. Levantino
178. N. MOSTERT, supra note 1, at 60.
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